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R. Glenn Hubbard
Studies of heterogeneity in firms' terms of trade in capital markets have oc-
cupied a prominent place in applied research in financial markets. The Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research commissioned monographs on the sub-
ject in the 1940s and 1950s—in part because of the differential importance of
"financial factors" for the performance of various types of firms during the
Depression—and again in the early 1980s.
1 Studies of the growth and devel-
opment of firms have long proceeded in research in industrial organization,
but formal analysis of the role of finance in the development of firms has come
much more recently.
Beginning with the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the idea
that financial structure was indeterminate and irrelevant for investment deci-
sions (apart from tax considerations) heavily influenced modern finance. The
major developments in investment research in the 1960s—the neoclassical
and q models
2—made use of Modigliani-Miller propositions in employing
variables from financial markets. Empirical work has traditionally produced
results inconsistent with the notion of "financial irrelevance," including evi-
dence on the role of breakdowns in financial trade in historically important
economic contractions;
3 the role of movements in internal finance in predict-
ing investment;
4 persistent differences in the way certain types of firms raise
finance;
5 and the regular cyclical movements of financial variables (e.g., bal-
ance sheet positions, liquidity ratios, and bank credit).
6
Reconciliation of theoretical and empirical research on finance and invest-
ment has made use of models in which informational asymmetries between
"borrowers" and "lenders" introduce incentive problems in financial relation-
ships, complicating the development of financial contracts and making financ-
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ing and investment decisions interdependent in specific ways.
7 Much of the
new research has proceeded in two agendas, modeling (i) the role of asym-
metric information in linking movements in inside finance and investment,
holding constant underlying opportunities, and (ii) the importance of infor-
mation problems in accounting for observed differences in financing patterns
and mechanisms for corporate control. These agendas center on the common
theme of the importance of particular asymmetries of information between
"insiders" and "outsiders" in firm financial transactions and the present test-
able violations of "financial irrelevance" propositions in studying control and
investment decisions. Below I review each in turn, grouping papers presented
in the conference accordingly.
Asymmetric Information, Internal Finance, and Investment
One feature of many theoretical models of asymmetric information in cap-
ital markets is that the level of internal net worth becomes a critical determi-
nant of the terms under which firms can borrow, holding constant true invest-
ment opportunities (see, e.g., Leland and Pyle 1977; Bernanke and Gertler
1990; Calomiris and Hubbard 1990; and Gertler and Hubbard 1988). This role
for internal finance in the investment decision is potentially important for
models of aggregate investment through two channels. First, to the extent that
movements in firms' collateralizable net worth are procyclical, an "accelera-
tor" mechanism emerges (see, e.g., Gertler and Hubbard 1988). This effect
would not be present under perfect capital markets. Second, distributional
considerations will be important for aggregate investment variability because
of the impact of the redistribution on firms' internal net worth. This channel
is closely related to the "debt deflation" arguments of Fisher (1933), Kindle-
berger (1978), and Minsky (1975), among others.
A second mechanism through which informational asymmetries can precip-
itate a difference in the cost of internal and external finance—that is, making
internal net worth more valuable, holding constant investment opportuni-
ties—is a "lemons market" problem in valuation. The classic argument (due
to Akerlof 1970) is that some sellers with inside information about the quality
of an asset will be unwilling to accept the terms offered by a less informed
buyer. This may cause the market to break down, or at least force the sale of
an asset at a price lower than it would command if all buyers and sellers had
full information. This idea has been applied to both equity finance and debt
finance.
For equity finance, new shareholders demand a premium to purchase the
shares of relatively good firms to offset the losses arising from funding lemons
(see, e.g., Myers and Majluf 1984; Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss 1984; and
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988). This premium raises the cost of new
equity finance faced by managers of relatively high-quality firms above the
opportunity cost of internal finance faced by existing shareholders.Introduction
In debt markets, Keeton (1979) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have demon-
strated that equilibrium "credit rationing" can arise in the presence of adverse
selection.
8 In the simplest case, lenders cannot price discriminate (i.e., vary
interest rates) between good and bad borrowers in loan contracts, because the
riskiness of projects is unobservable. Thus, when interest rates increase, rela-
tively good borrowers drop out of the market, increasing the probability of
default and possibly decreasing lenders' expected profits. In equilibrium,
lenders may set an interest rate that leaves an excess demand for loans. Some
borrowers receive loans, while other observationally equivalent borrowers are
rationed. Calomiris and Hubbard (1990) extend this approach by allowing for
heterogeneity in borrower types and in endowments of inside finance. De-
pending on per capita levels of internal net worth, the allocation of new funds
across classes of borrowers could either follow the symmetric-information
credit allocation or ration funds away from some classes of borrowers who
would receive credit in the absence of asymmetric information. A "financial
collapse" may occur, in which some or all classes of "asymmetric informa-
tion" borrowers are denied loans.
In summary, these approaches model the differential cost of external finance
from securities and banking markets under asymmetric information and the
role of internal net worth in influencing the cost of finance. This suggests that
certain classes of borrowers may find it prohibitively expensive to obtain fi-
nancing by directly issuing securities on the open market. Financial interme-
diaries help overcome this friction by exploiting scale economies in the eval-
uation and monitoring of borrowers—thus facilitating the flow of funds
between savers and certain kinds of investors. Hence, the terms under which
intermediary credit is available are key determinants of investment by firms
lacking easy access to direct credit (see Bernanke 1983; and Calomiris, Hub-
bard, and Stock 1986 for applications of these points).
Most of the research on the importance of asymmetric information in finan-
cial markets has focused on specific microeconomic models of market failure
in debt or equity markets, as in the studies noted above. To the extent that a
sufficient number of firms must raise finance in markets lacking perfect infor-
mation, microeconomic market failures can generate correlations in aggregate
data different from those suggested by standard models of investment or the
consequences of macroeconomic policies. In particular, some "price" signals
in capital markets will be less important; interest rates would be deemphasized
as a determinant of borrowing and investment, with movements in internal net
worth of corporate borrowers being relatively more important.
Bruce Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz consider the effects on investment de-
cisions of equity and credit rationing at the firm level. Positive aggregate prof-
itability shocks raise firms' net worth and inside finance, leading to increases
in current and future investment, further stimulating an accelerator mecha-
nism in aggregate investment. Similar logic is applied by the authors to other
types of investment as well (e.g., in working capital or employment). TheyR. Glenn Hubbard
extend these ideas in a model of the banking sector, which is also assumed to
be effectively constrained in raising new equity capital. The availability of
credit to firms now depends on the financial condition (accumulated internal
net worth) of both firms and the banking sector, reinforcing the accelerator
mechanism in investment. The Greenwald-Stiglitz model has both short-run
and long-run implications. In the short run, the effects of monetary policy on
investment and output are magnified through relaxation of financing con-
straints. Long-run dynamics are driven by rates of accumulation in capital and
internal equity. The approach taken by Greenwald and Stiglitz underscores the
ability of models of information-related capital market frictions to explain
accelerator movements in aggregate variables, dynamics difficult to account
for in conventional neoclassical models of investment and growth.
A related application exists for rationalizing the importance of contracting
models in macroeconomics. The use of contract-based theories in models of
aggregate supply has for some time been standard, most notably in "new
Keynesian" explanations of Phillips curve correlations in aggregate time-
series data. Roger Farmer employs a different set of contracting theories to-
ward the same end, stressing problems in financial contracting in the presence
of asymmetric information and limited collateral (self-finance). The transmis-
sion mechanism is drawn from models of the role of internal net worth in the
investment decision. At high levels of profits or collateralizable net worth,
incentive problems are mitigated, and the cost of funds is low, expanding eco-
nomic activity. Farmer focuses on movements in interest rates in bringing
about Phillips curve correlations in data. Deflationary shocks raise real inter-
est rates, reducing the value of internal net worth, with negative effects on
economic activity.
9 In addition, he stresses the role of the nominal interest
rate; the optimal contract for the firm trades off the opportunity cost of holding
liquid balances against the benefits of additional liquidity. The benefits arise
from the fact that liquidity buffers permit firms to offer more stable wages,
facilitating more efficient employment decisions.
Farmer presents some empirical work in support of the asymmetric-infor-
mation/limited-collateral approach, with an application to simple Phillips-
curve-type models. He finds (using data for the United States over the period
from 1931 to 1986) that movements in the unemployment rate are negatively
correlated with movements in inflation and corporate profits and positively
correlated with movements in nominal interest rates. With the inclusion of the
profits variable, the model is stable over subsamples of the postwar period.
While the results are open to differences in interpretation, they suggest sup-
port for the idea that asymmetric-information problems in financial markets
figure importantly in accounting for Phillips curve correlations.
To the extent that credit constraints are important for certain classes of
firms, equilibrium models of asset pricing will be affected. William Brock and
Blake LeBaron consider the impact of finance constraints on market valuation
of firms within a particular class of asset-pricing models. Specifically, theyIntroduction
develop a production-based, rational-expectations asset-pricing simulation
model with and without credit constraints. "Constrained" and "uncon-
strained" firms are alike except that the former cannot use noncollateralized
debt to finance investment. Unconstrained firms maximize their market value
by selecting investment projects that optimally trade off expected returns and
systematic risk. The investment of constrained firms, on the other hand, is
restricted by past shocks (by assumption), since these firms cannot obtain
funds beyond their current resources. Their marginal expected returns will be
"too high."
Brock and LeBaron use this setup to analyze the phenomenon, noted in
many recent empirical studies, of "mean reversion" in security returns. They
show that mean reversion is amplified by financing constraints—positive
shocks to productivity affect a constrained firm's investment program more
than they affect an unconstrained firm's program. Brock and LeBaron empha-
size that binding credit constraints are an important feature of mean-reverting
returns in security markets. The authors also discuss a number of suggestive
implications of their work, including applications to recent results on seasonal
patterns in excess returns for small (a priori, financially constrained) firms.
A key feature of many models of capital market frictions based on asym-
metric information is that firm heterogeneity is important. Large, mature en-
terprises with substantial internal finance relative to their investment opportu-
nities are less likely to have their investment subject to financial constraints
than are younger, growing firms with lower net worth. Empirical tests of these
ideas have grouped firms according to proxies for the "net worth" distinctions
(see, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; and Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein 1990). Michael Devereux and Fabio Schiantarelli pursue this
route, motivating finance constraints by including a cost of debt increasing in
the level of debt, with the increased cost accounted for by the agency ("finan-
cial distress") cost of debt. Their model is an expanded version of the q model
used by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharf-
stein.
Devereux and Schiantarelli use panel data on 689 U.K. manufacturing firms
over the period from 1969 to 1986 and test for differences in the sensitivity of
investment to the availability of internal funds for firms of different sizes and
ages. They find that lagged measures of firm cash flow have an economically
important effect on investment, holding constant investment opportunities (as
measured by q); this effect is present for all size classes of firms. To the extent
that information problems are important, one would expect that "age" is a
reasonable characteristic by which to group firms according to information
intensity. Devereux and Schiantarelli find that cash-flow effects are particu-
larly important for younger, smaller firms. They note that the cash-flow effects
for large firms could reflect their more diversified ownership structure and
greater associated agency costs of finance.
One problem with many information-based models of links between inter-R. Glenn Hubbard
nal net worth and investment is that it is often difficult to find empirical prox-
ies sufficiently close to variables suggested by theory to permit formal tests.
In particular, many theoretical models are cast in terms of relatively small
enterprises producing a homogeneous good, with a single measure of collater-
alizable net worth. Case studies, focusing on firm heterogeneity within an
industry, provide a useful alternative to studies based on aggregate time-series
data or panel data for a large, diverse cross-section of firms. Peter Reiss uses
this approach to analyze investment behavior over the past decade for firms in
oil and gas extraction. Oil and gas prices have, of course, been quite volatile
over this period, indicating significant fluctuations in both investment oppor-
tunities and the value of firms' net worth (as measured by the value of oil and
gas reserves in place). Fluctuations in capital spending in the industry over
this period were much more pronounced than in the economy as a whole.
Reiss examines the importance of information problems for the investment
and financial contracting decisions of a set of "independent" oil and gas firms.
His principal findings are two. First, movements in internal finance have sys-
tematic effects on investment spending—holding constant the value of drilling
investment opportunities—particularly during downturns in oil prices. Sec-
ond, the availability of internal funds affects drilling firms' ownership stakes
in wells, as well as the structure of contracts through which external finance
is obtained. The patterns are consistent with the simultaneous determination
of financial structure and capital structure decisions under asymmetric infor-
mation. Reiss's careful case study illustrates the usefulness of more narrowly
focused analyses in measuring precisely changes in financial contracting and
the costliness of capital market frictions under asymmetric information.
Another explanation of observed correlations between movements in inter-
nal finance and investment spending stresses that managers have substantial
control over the use of corporate cash flows and have incentives to reinvest
these funds in perquisites or non-value-maximizing projects (see e.g., the
"free cash flow" model articulated in Jensen 1986). John Strong and John
Meyer ask two questions in this line of thought. First, do firms with larger
"free" cash flows exhibit different investment behavior? Second, do these dif-
ferences in investment behavior lead to poorer or better financial perform-
ance? Their study centers on an adaptation of the "residual funds" model of
Meyer and Kuh (1957). This approach posits that the level (and financing) of
firms' capital spending depends on the "residual funds" available after a hier-
archy of prior claims on corporate cash flow is satisfied. Likewise, investment
spending is decomposed into "sustaining" and "discretionary" categories, the
former corresponding to replacement investment and the latter to spending not
required to sustain a firm's core business. In the presence of monitoring prob-
lems, discretionary investment should depend positively on residual cash
flow. Residual cash flow should dominate total cash flow as a liquidity influ-
ence in that category of investment.
To test the predictions of their approach, Strong and Meyer consider invest-Introduction
ment decisions in 34 large paper corporations over the period from 1971 to
1986. The paper industry experienced substantial fluctuations in operating
performance over the period and has undergone considerable restructuring.
Their evidence for investment is consistent with the view that discretionary
investment is influenced by movements in residual funds. Moreover, links
between discretionary investment and shareholder returns are consistent with
an agency-cost interpretation: higher discretionary expenditures, ceteris pari-
bus, depress shareholder returns. The Strong-Meyer study suggests the bene-
fits of considering other case studies of firms in "mature" and "growing" in-
dustries, to contrast links between cash flow and investment.
Finally, the possibility that information problems in lending markets raise
the cost of finance for some classes of borrowers raises the question of
whether direct government intervention in credit markets would increase the
efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. Such a question is of
more than academic interest. At the end of 1988, outstanding federal direct
loans totaled $222 billion, with, in addition, two and one-half times as much
outstanding in the form of loan guarantees. Loan and loan-guarantee pro-
grams exist in a number of sectors, including education, agriculture, housing,
and small businesses, and the cost of the programs is substantial. Some of
these sectors have been identified as prototypes for "credit rationing," at least
raising the possibility that credit market interventions would be efficiency im-
proving. Assessing the effectiveness of such policies in the context of formal
models of credit rationing in loan markets is difficult and requires a careful
specification of the information problem and of the form that potential govern-
ment interventions would assume.
William Gale takes up these issues in his paper for this volume. He consid-
ers (in a model in which borrowers have private information about their risk
characteristics) the efficiency costs generated by using collateral as a sorting
device when it is worth less to lenders than to borrowers. In equilibrium,
relatively high-risk borrowers choose a contract with a high interest rate and
low collateral requirement; low-risk borrowers signal their type by choosing
to put up substantial collateral in exchange for a lower interest rate. As long
as all borrowers have projects whose gross returns are greater than their social
opportunity cost (which is assumed in Gale's model), the efficiency loss cre-
ated by the use of collateral creates a scope for government intervention. In
the context of his model, subsidies to unrationed borrowers will reduce the
extent of rationing in the whole sector, hence increasing efficiency. On the
other hand, interventions targeting borrowers who are denied loans in private
credit markets can raise the extent of rationing, reducing efficiency. Analyzing
this distinction is important, since most government credit programs are
aimed at the low-risk borrower. Gale's paper raises some concerns with this
approach and suggests the need to analyze the effects of government credit
programs on credit allocation using richer models that incorporate more gen-
eral financial contracts.8 R. Glenn Hubbard
Asymmetric Information, Corporate Control, and Differences in
Financing Mechanisms
The problem of monitoring and controlling managers with access to private
information about firm opportunities and costs has been noted at least since
the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932). Modern theoretical work on
principal-agent problems has stressed the endogeneity of financial contracts to
align the incentives of "insiders" and "outsiders" in business transactions (see
notably Jensen and Meckling 1976, and the large literature that followed).
Much attention has been focused on capital structure decisions, in which the
use of debt relative to equity is related to, inter alia, the specificity of assets
and the relative importance of idiosyncratic and aggregate fluctuations in ac-
counting for firm earnings movements. Other researchers have focused on
mechanisms used by capital markets to minimize agency-cost problems.
1
0
A key feature of the new research on capital market frictions stemming
from asymmetric information is its emphasis on the use of particular forms of
contracting mechanisms and monitoring arrangements. These mechanisms
are chosen to minimize the added cost of finance under asymmetric informa-
tion. While much of the traditional literature on capital structure decisions has
focused on the choice of "debt" versus "equity," the asymmetric information
approach stresses the design of contracts between "insiders" and "outsiders,"
which will, in general, embody a mixture of debt and equity features along
with ancillary monitoring arrangements (see the overview in Gertler and Hub-
bard 1988). Empirical research here analyzes the determinants of firm financ-
ing arrangements, the information content of movements in security prices,
and the value of particular monitoring arrangement between insiders and out-
siders in corporate finance.
Do firms care who provides their financing? Most studies of capital struc-
ture (theoretical and empirical) address factors motivating the choice of secu-
rity (e.g., debt vs. equity) rather than the provider of funds (e.g., private vs.
public sources). If problems of asymmetric information in capital markets are
significant, however, examining variation across firms in who provides funds
is likely to be important. Finding that firms do indeed distinguish between
private and public and internal and external sources of funds can rationalize
observed effects of internal finance on investment. In addition, if credit market
segmentation is important, fluctuations in conditions in particular credit mar-
kets will have real effects. Jeffrey MacKie-Mason pursues these questions,
documenting trends and patterns in incremental sources of financial capital (at
the industry and aggregate level) and analyzing a large sample of incremental
corporate financial decisions. In particular, he distinguishes between theories
that generate predictions for the type of security and theories that predict dif-
ferences in the type of provider.
The empirical work begins with the distinction of choices of financial con-
tract by type of contingent financial claim (debt or equity) and by the providerIntroduction
of funds (private or publicly marketed sources). MacKie-Mason uses the
nested logit approach to estimate two models—according to whether the firm
chooses first whether to use public or private sources, and then debt or equity,
or vice versa. The data are drawn from SEC registered offerings that are
matched with COMPUSTAT data to obtain information firm characteristics.
The patterns of preferences suggested by the data indicate that problems of
asymmetric information are an important determinant of financing choices.
That is, firms are concerned with who provides their financing, and not just
with the standard factors thought to influence the mix of debt and equity fi-
nance.
An important feature of many models of asymmetric information in finan-
cial markets is that institutional considerations for monitoring and financial
contracting are significant. Evidence from a cross section of countries is par-
ticularly useful, since one can test whether differences in capital market insti-
tutions and financial regulation affect the design of financial contracts. Like-
wise, given the variation in the tax treatment of alternative sources of finance
across countries, a finding of similarities in financing patterns would suggest
the relevance of common factors in the costs and benefits of particular forms
of financial contracts and arrangements. In his overview of financing patterns
in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Fin-
land, and Canada, Colin Mayer outlines a set of stylized facts about the strong
common trends in corporate finance. Those patterns include the dominance of
internal funds in financing investment, the importance of bank finance as a
source of external funds, and systematic variations in financing patterns across
firms of various sizes.
Mayer interprets the set of common factors in financing patterns for his set
of countries as supporting recent theoretical models linking corporate finance
to corporate control. The particular link he stresses is the claim that outside
investors can make in the event of a default by insiders. In particular, assets
specific to their current employment will be difficult to finance externally, and
the use of external finance will be negatively related to the cost of organizing
external control. The persistent common patterns in corporate finance across
countries that Mayer identifies suggest that information-related capital market
frictions are universally important. Further support for this view is provided
by departures from common patterns, which can be explained by differences
in monitoring and corporate control mechanisms. This suggests that case stud-
ies of corporate control mechanisms in particular countries will be useful for
analyzing problems of asymmetric information.
To the extent that asymmetric information in financing decisions is impor-
tant, analyses of seasoned equity issues should be of particular interest.
Equity is a residual claim on firms, so that asymmetries of information should
figure prominently in the decisions of buyers of common stock issues. In ad-
dition, a number of empirical studies have suggested that returns during the
period surrounding an equity issue are abnormal, suggesting that information10 R. Glenn Hubbard
is in fact being revealed during the issue. Robert Koracjzyk, Deborah Lucas,
and Robert McDonald address these concerns and develop a model of stock
price reactions to equity issues under asymmetric information. They begin by
reviewing existing empirical evidence on increases in stock prices just prior
to an equity issue and the subsequent drop in stock prices at the issue, noting
that most explanations of these patterns individually in the literature cannot
explain the two price movements together.
Koracjzyk, Lucas, and McDonald assume that managers—who act in the
interest of existing shareholders—have private information about the firm's
true value. Consider two firms—one undervalued and one overvalued—that
plan to issue equity; because of having to forgo investment opportunities
while waiting, postponing the issue is costly to both. Undervalued firms will
wait for their price to rise (as their type is slowly revealed to the market) so
that their price path rises before an issue. Overvalued firms do not wait, so
that their price path is flat prior to the issue. Thus, on average, stock price
path prior to issue will be upward sloping. The negative price reaction upon
issue can be explained within a "lemons" framework—issuing signals that the
firm is on average overvalued, so that the stock price drops.
Another possible explanation for the price rise prior to issue is that the
market has learned of the arrival of a "good" project that the firm has yet to
undertake. Koracjzyk, Lucas, and McDonald cast doubt on that alternative by
demonstrating that price increases also occur prior to secondary issues (large
block sales by existing equity holders) which reveal information but have
nothing to do with additions to the firm's capital. On the other hand, firms
issuing equity experience a rise in Tobin's q prior to the issue and a subsequent
fall, a pattern consistent with firms' issuing equity to finance growth oppor-
tunities. While the evidence offered by Koracjzyk, Lucas, and McDonald is
consistent with the importance of asymmetric information in explaining stock
price reactions during seasoned equity issues, it is difficult to make inferences
about effects on the efficiency of the investment process. If the stock price
declines represent appropriate downward revision in the value of the firm,
there has only been a shift in the timing of information about market value.
On the other hand, if "bad" firms issue equity to pool with "good" firms, the
lemons-market efficiency problems raised by Myers and Majluf (1984) be-
come important.
Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein have focused on Japan
as a case study of the development and value of monitoring arrangements in
financial markets in the presence of asymmetric information. In their previous
(1990) work, these authors examined the effect of internal finance on invest-
ment spending by Japanese firms, holding constant investment opportunities
(as approximated by Tobin's q). Using panel data, they grouped firms accord-
ing to whether they were members of keiretsu industrial groups. They find
that membership in a group and the presence of a group "main bank" are
important in the provision of information and the avoidance of credit rationing
when investment opportunities are promising. While liquidity effects on in-11 Introduction
vestment were found to be important for nongroup firms, the investment be-
havior of member firms is well described by a q model.
In their paper for this volume, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein extend
their earlier work by observing diflFerences in the effects of banking relation-
ships on the sensitivity of investment to internal finance during the 1980s (in
the aftermath of a major deregulation of Japanese financial markets). The gen-
eral features of the deregulation included easing restrictions on issuing bonds
abroad and permitting the issuance of noncollateralized bonds in domestic
securities markets. Reliance of firms on banks for debt finance diminished
substantially during this period. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharf stein test for
shifts in the investment behavior of group firms, contrasting firms that de-
creased their reliance on main bank finance (seeking finance instead from the
domestic and foreign bond market) and firms who retained their bank ties. For
the latter group, investment remained insensitive to movements in firm liquid-
ity (holding constant investment opportunities) before and after banking de-
regulation. For the former, investment spending became more sensitive to
fluctuations in firm liquidity. The key question is, then, the following: If bank
monitoring overcomes information problems and relaxes credit constraints,
why did some firms sever their bank ties? The authors' work points up impor-
tant issues to consider in assessing the costs and benefits of banking relation-
ships in Japan, as well as in the design of new theories of the choice between
bank debt and public debt.
A variety of strategies is available in capital markets to mitigate the cost of
capital market frictions in the presence of asymmetric information. These
strategies need not involve modifications in capital structure; it is possible, for
example, for outside shareholders in a firm to monitor insiders (managers).
Of course, with a large number of shareholders with dispersed holdings, free-
rider problems arise. However, large shareholders can realize the benefits of
their informed action, and can effectively express their concerns about corpo-
rate governance through their voting power. There has been little direct evi-
dence on the question of whether a large shareholder can reduce information-
related costs in capital markets, deterring managerial self-interest. To the ex-
tent that larger shareholders can accomplish this, they provide a delegated
monitoring function, in that their actions provide information to smaller
shareholders, who individually do not find it in their economic interest to
incur the cost of monitoring.
Richard Zeckhauser and John Pound consider this possibility. After outlin-
ing the potential impact of large shareholders on insiders' incentives and the
flow of information, they use cross-sectional data on firms to test for system-
atic variation in performance among firms with large shareholders (after con-
trolling for industry differences). As a proxy for the severity of information
problem, Zeckhauser and Pound classify industries according to whether cap-
ital and investments are highly firm-specific. The basic idea is that when as-
sets are specific to the management, it is more difficult for large shareholders
(acting as monitors) to improve performance; that is, features of asset specific-12 R. Glenn Hubbard
ity and closed information structure are assumed to be related. Zeckhauser
and Pound find that earnings-price ratios (their measure of performance) are
significantly lower for firms with large shareholders in industries with open
information structures (i.e., where assets are less specific and monitoring is
potentially valuable). There is no comparable "large shareholder" effect for
firms in industries subject to closed information structure. The evidence pre-
sented by Zeckhauser and Pound provides a suggestive first step toward mea-
suring the benefits of the delegated monitoring mechanism provided by large
shareholders.
Notes
1. See, e.g., Koch (1943), Merwin (1942), Lutz (1945), Dobrovolsky (1951), and
Friedman (1982b, 1985).
2. See, e.g., Hall and Jorgenson (1967) on neoclassical models. On q models, see
Brainard and Tobin (1968), Tobin (1969), and subsequent developments in Hayashi
(1982), Summers (1981), and Abel and Blanchard (1986).
3. See the discussion in Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) for the period in the United
States prior to the founding of the Federal Reserve and the discussion in Bernanke
(1983) for the 1930s.
4. This point was made forcefully by Meyer and Kuh (1957) and Eisner (1978).
The development of empirical tests of the role of internal finance in the investment
decision is discussed in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and extended in the
context of Euler equation models of financial constraints and investment by Hubbard
and Kashyap (1989), Gilchrist (1989), and Whited (1989).
5. Such patterns were highlighted in an early study by Butters and Lintner (1945).
Gertler and Hubbard (1988) review differences in financing patterns by firm size for
contemporary data.
6. See, e.g., Wojnilower (1980), Eckstein and Sinai (1986), and Friedman (1982a).
7. This literature is summarized in Gertler (1988).
8. Earlier, Jafifee and Russell (1976) demonstrated that the cost of credit would in
general be higher under asymmetric information—the market interest rate must
increase, and loan size may be limited, when lenders cannot distinguish borrower
quality.
9. Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) have stressed this channel in accounting for Phil-
lips curve correlations in aggregate data for the United States in the period prior to the
founding of the Federal Reserve system—a period in which deflationary shocks, in-
vestment collapse, and recession were coincident.
10. See, e.g., Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), and Gertler and Hubbard (1990).
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